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Abstract: The Self-shrinking p-adic cryptographic generator (SSPCG) is a fast software stream cipher. Improved 
cryptoanalysis of the SSPCG is introduced. This cryptoanalysis makes more precise the length of the period of 
the generator. The linear complexity and the cryptography resistance against most recently used attacks are 
invesigated. Then we discuss how such attacks can be avoided. The results show that the sequence generated 
by a SSPCG has  a large period, large linear complexity and is stable against the cryptographic attacks. This 
gives the reason to consider the SSPSG as suitable for critical cryptographic applications in stream cipher 
encryption algorithms. 
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Introduction 
Stream ciphers have several properties that make them suitable for use in telecommunication applications. But 
apart from the security tried to obtain, the main property that makes stream ciphers distinguishable from block 
ciphers is that they are in general fast and have low hardware complexity. Stream ciphers process the plaintext 
character by character, so no buffering is required to accumulate a full plaintext block. 
Most stream ciphers are based on simple devices that are easy to implement and run efficiently. A common 
example of such a device is the linear feedback shift register (LFSR). Such simple devices produce predictable 
output given some previous output. This is due to the linear property of the device. Therefore, in order to use 
LFSRs in cryptographical primitive, and particularly in a stream cipher, the linearity must be destroyed [Yilmaz, 
2004]. Unfortunately, the classical fast and cheap LFSRs are vulnerable to the so-named “Berlekamp-Massey 
crypto attack” [Lidl, Niederreiter, 1983], [Oorshot, Menezes, Vanstone, 1997], [Schneier, 1996]. 
Having in mind the advantages of the stream ciphers with simple structure, recently some theorists have used 
new approach of stream cipher design and have proposed a few new architectures named Shrinking generator 
[Coppersmith, Krawczyk, Mansour, 1994] and Self-Shrinking generator [Meier, Staffelbach, 1998]. With regard to 
positive features of the two generators and Feedback with Carry Shift Registers (FCSRs) [Klapper, Goresky, 
1994], [Xu, 2000] the SSPCG [Tasheva, 2005], [Tasheva, Bedzhev, 2005], [Tasheva, Bedzhev, Stoyanov, 2005] 
have created. The results show that the SSPCG is a promising candidate for high-speed encryption applications 
due to its simplicity and provable properties. 
In this paper, the SSPCG is further investigated with main focus on the period, linear complexity and resistance 
against the recently used cryptographic attacks. The improved cryptoanalysis shows SSPCG suitable for critical 
cryptographic applications. 
Description of the Self-shrinking p-adic cryptographic generator 
In contrast with the classic Self-Shrinking generator the SSPCG architecture (Fig. 1) uses a p-adic FCSR instead 
of LFSR. This allows the generator to produce a number in the range 0 to p−1 (p-its) in one step (ai = [0, 1, …, 
International Book Series "Information Science and Computing" 
 
 
113
p−1]). TheSSPCG selects a portion of the output p-adic FCSR sequence by controlling of the p-adic FCSR itself 
using the following algorithm: 
 
Fig. 1 Self-shrinking p-adic cryptographic generator 
 
Definition 1: The algorithm of the Self-Shrinking p-adic Generator (Fig. 1) consists of the following steps: 
1. The p-adic FCSR R is clocked with clock sequence with period 0τ . 
2. If the p-adic FCSR output number is not equal to 0 (ai ≠ 0), the output bit forms a part of the p-adic SSPCG 
sequence. Otherwise, if the output number of the p-adic FCSR is equal to 0 (ai = 0), the p-adic output number of 
SSPG is discarded. 
3. The shrunken p-adic SSPG output sequence is transformed in 2-adic sequence in which every p-adic number 
is presented with ⎡ ⎤)1(log2 −p  binary digits, where ⎡ ⎤x  is the smallest integer which is greater or equal to x. 
Every output number i from 1 to p−1 of p-adic SSPCG sequence is depicted with p−adic expansion of the 
number: 
⎡ ⎤
2
)1(21
)1(log2 −−+−
− pi
p
 (1) 
The SSPCG uses the generalization of 2-adic FCSRs with stage contents and feedback coefficients in Z/(p) 
where p is a prime number, not necessarily 2. 
 
 
Fig. 2 Galois FCSR 
 
Definition 2: A p-adic feedback with carry shift register with Galois architecture of length L (Fig. 2) consists of L 
stages (or delay elements) numbered 0, 1, …, L-1, each capable to store one p-adic (0, 1, …, p-1) number and 
having one input and one output; and a clock which controls the movement of data. During each clock cycle the 
following operations are performed: 
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1. The content of stage 0 is output and forms part of the output sequence; 
2. The sum modulo p after stage i is passed to stage i - 1 for each i, 1 ≤ i ≤ L−1; 
3. The output of the last stage 0 is introduced into each of the tapped cells simultaneously, where it is fully added 
(with carry) to the contents of the preceding stages. 
The q1, q2, …, qL are the feedback multipliers and the cells denoted with c1, c2, …, cL−1 are the memory (or carry) 
bits. If q = -1+q1p + q2p2 +...+ qLpL is the base p expansion of a positive integer q ≡ -1 (mod p), then q is a 
connection integer for a FCSR with feedback coefficients q1, q2, …, qL in Z/(p). 
With each clock cycle, the integer sums jjjj cqaa ++= 0σ  is accumulated. At the next clock cycle this sum 
modulo p )(mod' 1 pa nj σ=−  is passed on the next stage in the register, and the new memory values are 
)(' 1 pdivc nj σ=− . 
The nonlinearity of the proposed SSPG follows from the fact that it is unknown at which positions the FCSR 
sequence is shrunken. As a result the linear algebraic structure of the original FCSR sequence is destroyed. The 
software SSPG implementation is very fast because the pseudorandom generator produces ⎡ ⎤)1(log2 −p  
binary digits in every step. 
It is proved that the period of the SSPCG realized by maximum length p-adic FCSR of length L and connection 
integer q is ⎡ ⎤)1(log2*00 −= pTS , where *0T  is the number of output p-adic FCSR numbers different from 0.  
The self-shrunken output SSPCG sequence generated by maximum length p-adic FCSR of length L and 
connection integer q is a balanced sequence. 
The results from statistical analysis show that the sequence generated by SSPG is uniform, scalable, 
uncompressible and unpredictable. 
Improved cryptoanalysis of the Self-shrinking p-adic cryptographic generator 
In this section novel results concerning period, linear complexity, and cryptoresistance of SSPCG sequences are 
presented. 
First, we will remind that the period of p-adic FCSR is T0 = 2d, where the connection integer 12 += dq  
[Goresky, Klapper, 2002], and p0 and q are strong p-prime numbers [Xu, 2000]. Since the output sequence of the 
SSPCG is balanced each different from p-its will have 
⎥⎥
⎤⎢⎢
⎡≈
p
TT p 00  (2) 
number of appearances in a period T0. Due to of the fact that there is an exit only in different from 0 p-its, then 
*
0T  acquires the following appearance: 
⎥⎥
⎤⎢⎢
⎡−≈
p
TpT 0*0 )1(  (3) 
Then the period of the SSPCG S0 could be found with the help of the following expression: 
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From (4) follows that linear complexity has the following value: 
⎡ ⎤⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
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dpZλ  (5) 
Both the Shrinking Generator and Self-Shrinking Generator use the LFSRs and have a simple structure. Despite 
of this fact no successful cryptanalytic attack for both generators has been published so far. 
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Due to the nonuniform exit from the SSPCG it is impossible to apply the p-adic Rational Approximation attack 
[Xu, 2000]. 
All attacks acting against the Self-Shrinking pseudorandom generator [Zenner, Krause, Lucks, 2001] are 
unapplicable, due to the fact that they act against the generator constructed by LFSRs. 
With a respect of [Zenner, Krause, Lucks, 2001] we recommend the design of the including FCSR to be upper 
than 256 memory cells in order to hinder the cryptographic attacks time-memory-data and Backtracking 
Algorithm. 
Conclusion 
The calculation of the period and the linear complexity of the SSPCG gives an opportunity of more successful 
software realization of this generator due to the greater security, due to using easily generated p-prime numbers. 
The impossibility for attacking the SSPCG with the familiar cryptographic attacks increases the reliability in the 
properties of the generator. 
The SSPCG is one example of a nonlinear combining function. The results presented in previous section mostly 
have a straightforward extension to general nonlinear combining functions in algebraic normal form. 
On the basis of the simplified design the SSPCG shows properties of a successful candiate as a main or slave 
pseudorandom generator in stream cipher encryption. 
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